A recent no-go theorem (Frauchiger and Renner in Nat Commun 9(1):3711, 2018) establishes a contradiction from a specific application of quantum theory to a multi- agent setting. The proof of this theorem relies heavily on notions such as ‘knows’ or ‘is certain that’. This has stimulated an analysis of the theorem by Nurgalieva and del Rio (in: Selinger P, Chiribella G (eds) Proceedings of the 15th international conference on quantum physics and logic (QPL 2018). EPTCS 287, Open Publishing Association, (...) Waterloo, 2018), in which they claim that it shows the “[i]nadequacy of modal logic in quantum settings” (ibid.). In this paper, we will offer a significantly extended and refined reconstruction of the theorem in multi-agent modal logic. We will then show that a thorough reconstruction of the proof as given by Frauchiger and Renner requires the reflexivity of access relations (system T). However, a stronger theorem is possible that already follows in serial frames, and hence also holds in systems of doxastic logic (such as KD45). After proving this, we will discuss the general implications for different interpretations of quantum probabilities as well as several options for dealing with the result. (shrink)

Festschrift in honor of S.P. Dubey, Indian philosopher; contributed articles.

An edition of the letters of Erasmus, regarded as one of the greatest humanist writers. All 12 volumes of this work have been reissued, complete with their scholarly apparatus of commentary and notes, as well as plates.

Using covariant derivatives and the operator definitions of quantum mechanics, gauge invariant Proca and Lehnert equations are derived and the Lorenz condition is eliminated in U(1) invariant electrodynamics. It is shown that the structure of the gauge invariant Lehnert equation is the same in an O(3) invariant theory of electrodynamics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Fragments RAILING AGAINST REALISM: PHILOSOPHY AND TO THE LIGHTHOUSE by S. P. ROSENBAUM The argument of Graheim Parkes's "Imagining Reality in To the Lighthouse" is described by its author as "a railing against the realist position" (p. 35) as he understands it primarily in my article "The Philosophical Reedism ofVirginia Woolf." ' Apart from the question of whemer railing is a useful way of conducting an inquiry (...) into literature and philosophy, Parkes's discussion raises several important issues about these connections. The way diey are raised, however, involves various mistedces and muddles that make a brief reply to his eurticle difficult. To begin with a small reveeding example, Parkes asserts that I miss the irony in Virginia Woolfs use of die letters P, Q, and R to describe Mr. Ramsay's problems of diought (p. 41). Here is what I wrote: "By representing Mr. Ramsay 's thinking as proceeding in die very genered form of conventional logical symbols, Virginia Woolf is wittily extending the standard letters used to symbolize die conditional type of argument, If P men Cf (p. 339, with italics added this time). Parkes's misreading of my text does not inspire confidence when he turns to Virginia Woolfs fiction or G. E. Moore's philosophy. On a more significant issue, Parkes complains that I boggle his mind by saying diat philosophically, Moore influenced Virginia Woolf more man anyone else, whereas Platonic ideas abound in her books (p. 35). Of course they do, but not very much in her epistemology, which was the subject of my eurticle.2 What Peirkes does not mention is that Plato was also a profound influence on Moore's philosophy. One of die reasons Moore's influence on Bloomsbury was so strong is that he reinterpreted Plato for them. In her images and ideas Virginia Woolf was influenced direcdy dirough her reading of Plato etnd also indirectly through the work of Plotinus and Moore. These influences are not easily sepeurated, which is why studies of Platonic emd Neoplatonic influences in her work that ignore Moore's significance are so incomplete. 89 90Philosophy and Literature Peirkes claims mat die evidence of Moore's influence on Virginia Woolf is slight (p. 34), and then he concerns himself with the putative influences of German philosophers for whom mere is no evidence at all. In the fifteen years since I wrote my article, the biographical evidence for Moore's influence has continued to accumulate as Virginia Woolfs letters, memoirs, emd dieiries were published. From her first novel, in which Principia Etnica is quoted emd briefly discussed, down to die recently discovered revised version of her last memoir, in which she reaffirms her deep respect for Moore,3 the indications of Moore's significance for Virginia Woolf ought to convince any disinterested reader. It cannot be dismissed with a sneer about "the voguish fascination of the Bloomsbury Group..." (p. 34), especially from someone proposing to study yet again the depth psychology of her fiction via Nietzsche and Heidegger (P- 44). Nothing I say here, of course, will persuade Parkes of the value of philosophical realism for understanding To the Lighthouse because diat philosophy, as he conceives of it in his article, consists of straw. To tedce just one exeimple, Peirkes appeeurs to believe Moore's epistemology etrgues "diat things and persons are what they are independently of human consciousness" (p. 37). There is no space here to explain philosophical realism again to Parkes, odier than to note that it is not inconsistent with the veirious concerns (to use Peurkes's terminology) about "transpersonal imagination" or "participation in phenomena" that he finds so interesting in the novel. But what about die novel? For readers indifferent to whether Moore or Russell, Nietzsche or Heidegger are to be found in To the Lighthouse, the relevant question is what such philosophical interpretations medce of it. To them I ceui only say, reread the novel and then ask yourselves if an account of it diat says nothing about die value of art and almost nodiing about the value oflove bears much resemblance to your reading experience. Parkes thinks the portrait of Mr. Ramsay is unsympathetic because he is criticized emd mocked... (shrink)

Evidence is currently mixed regarding the way in which cognitive conflict modulates the effect of emotion on task performance. The present study aimed to address methodological differences across previous studies and investigate the conditions under which interference from emotional stimuli can either be elicited or eliminated under high cognitive conflict. Four behavioural experiments were conducted with a university sample using a gender-discrimination stimulus-response compatibility task. In line with our previous findings, Experiment 1 found that when emotion and cognitive conflict conditions (...) were blocked, emotional faces increased reaction time interference during response compatible trials (low conflict) but not response incompatible trials (high conflict). However, when conflict and emotion conditions were randomised in different configurations across Experiments 2 (all trials randomised), 3 (emotion blocked, compatibility randomised) and 4 (compatibility blocked, emotion randomised), emotion interfered with task performance across both high and low conflict trials. These results suggest that predictability of both compatibility and emotion is required in order to obtain reduced emotional interference under high cognitive conflict. Consistent with prior reports, a top–down anticipatory control mechanism seems to be engaged in the presence of negative emotion when there are incompatible stimulus-response mappings. (shrink)

This work is the first to demonstrate the differences and similarities between Plato's myths and the traditional kind of which he was critical. It also actively demonstrates the extent to which his own myths support or undermine the philosophical ideas of the dialogues in which they are set. It offers new arguments and criticism on point of detail concerning modern interpretations.

Collection of addresses of the general presidents of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

Collection of addresses of the general presidents of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

The article examines the interpretation peculiarities of notions about objectiveness through the prism of grammatical characteristics of the noun in Bulgarian language in comparison with Russian. The author suppose that conceptualization of objectiveness primarily related to quantitative categorization. Specific, individual objects are conceptualized as ''a single unit''; specific set of similar specific objects conceptualized as ''many''; fractional objects conceptualized as uncounted items, converse is also true – uncounted items conceptualized as fractional objects. Depending on other characteristics (structure of the object, (...) the object functioning, interaction with the object, even through relation to the object, a unit can be conceptualized as functional ''many'' (dual nouns), and many – as a functional ''single unit'' (collective nouns). The following grammatical classes are distinguished by the method of conceptual categorization of objectiveness: 1) class of counable nouns (having correlative singular and plural forms) – they reflect the conceptualization of the whole as ''a single unit'' and of multiplicity as ''many''; 2) class of dual nouns (having plural form only) – they reflect conceptualization of the whole as ''many'' and located on the periphery of the language objectiveness; 3) class of collective nouns (having a singular form only) – they reflect the conceptualization of multiplicity as ''a single unit'' and also located on the periphery of the language objectiveness; 4) class of nouns serving as names for the masses (both real and abstract) (having only single or plural form) –they reflect the conceptualization of fractional as ''non-integral (continuum)'' and located between the core of the language objectiveness and its periphery. Their periferal location is the reason for dual and collective nouns to be the weakest elements of the language objectiveness. This is typical for the Bulgarian language and to a lesser extent for Russian and other Slavic languages whose sintetizm also ''supports'' the classes relatively stable. The comparison of methods of conceptualization and grammatical categorization of objectiveness in Bulgarian and Russian has led to conclusion that the greatest affinity between the two languages is observed in the ''prototypical'' nuclear objectiveness represented by countable nouns having correlative singular and plural forms, and the greatest differences were found on the periphery of objectiveness represented in both languages by dual collective nouns. (shrink)